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TAX EXEMPTION OF EDUCATIONAL PROPERTY
IN NEW YORK
W. David Curtisst
The author discusses the New York law applicable to the exemption of
educational property from taxation. He appraises the statutory require-
ments that property must be owned by a corporation or association
"organized exclusively" for educational purposes and must also be "used
exclusively" for carrying out such purposes in order to qualify for exemp-
tion. At the same time, he examines the case law which has developed in
connection with this matter.
I
INTRODUCTION
Section 300 of the New York Real Property Tax Law' provides that
"All real property within the state shall be subject to real property taxa-
tion... unless exempt therefrom by law."2 This article will discuss the
exemption of educational property3 from taxation and will be concerned
primarily with Section 420 of the Real Property Tax Law,' which states,
in part, as follows:
t A.B. 1938, LL.B. 1940, Cornell University. Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
I The Real Property Tax Law was enacted by Chapter 959 of the Laws of 1958, and
became effective Oct. 1, 1959. It includes former provisions of the Tax Law, the Education
Law, the Village Law and various other unconsolidated laws concerned with the assessment
and taxation of real property. Recurring reference will be made to opinions of Counsel of
the New York State Board of Equalization and Assessment. See N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law
§§ 200, 202 (McKinney 1960). These opinions have not been generally published and the
writer acknowledges his indebtedness and appreciation to Robert F. Kilmer, Esq., the
Board's able Counsel, for making these materials available.
2 N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 300 (McKinney 1960). N.Y. Const. art. 3, § 17 (McKinney
1954) prohibits the legislature from passing a private or local bill granting an exemption
from taxation on real or personal property. In this same connection N.Y. Const. art. 16, § 1
(McKinney 1954) states:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may be
altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal property used exclusively
for religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law and owned by any
corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for one or more of such
purposes and not operating for profit.
See also N.Y. Const. art. 18, § 2 (McKinney 1954) regarding the powers of the legislature
relative to housing.
3 The term "educational property" is used in this article as a shorthand reference to real
property which is owned by an educational institution and used for educational purposes.
4 N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 420 (McKinney 1960, Supp. 1966), effective Oct. 1,
1959, derived from N.Y. Tax Law § 4(6), repealed by N.Y. Laws of 1958, ch. 959.
Section 422 of the Real Property Tax Law provides that the real property of a membership,
limited profit housing company organized under the Membership Corporations Law and
Article II of the Private Housing Finance Law is under certain circumstances exempt from
taxation if "used exclusively to provide housing and auxiliary facilities for faculty members,
students, employees, . . . researchers and other personnel and their immediate families in
attendance or employed at colleges, universities, educational institutions. . . ." With respect
to the relationship between §§ 420 and 422, see St. Luke's Hosp. v. Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d 135,
144-45, 187 N.E.2d 769, 773, 237 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313-14 (1962). For a discussion of the
historical development of New York law relating to the exemption of educational property,
see Saxe, Charitable Exemption From Taxation in New York State on Real and Personal
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§ 420. Non-profit organizations
1. Real property owned by a corporation or association organized ex-
clusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for
religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary,
educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical
society, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes, for the enforce-
ment of laws relating to children or animals, or for two or more such pur-
poses, and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such
purposes either by the owning corporation or association or by another such
corporation or association as hereinafter provided shall be exempt from
taxation as provided in this section. Such real property shall not be exempt
if any officer, member or employee of the owning corporation or association
shall receive or may be lawfully entitled to receive any pecuniary profit from
the operations thereof, except reasonable compensation for services in effect-
ing one or more of such purposes, or as proper beneficiaries of its strictly
charitable purposes; or if the organization thereof for any such avowed
purposes be a guise or pretense for directly or indirectly making any other
pecuniary profit for such corporation or association or for any of its mem-
bers or employees; or if it be not in good faith organized or conducted
exclusively for one or more of such purposes.
2. If any portion of such real property is not so used exclusively to carry
out thereupon one or more of such purposes but is leased or otherwise used
for other purposes, such portion shall be subject to taxation and the remain-
ing portion only shall be exempt ....
3. Such real property from which no revenue is derived shall be exempt
though not in actual use therefor by reason of the absence of suitable
buildings or improvements thereon if (a) the construction of such buildings
or improvements is in progress or is in good faith contemplated by such
corporation or association or (b) such real property is held by such corpora-
tion or association upon condition that the title thereto shall revert in case
any building not intended and suitable for one or more such purposes shall
be erected upon such premises or some part thereof.
8. Real property exempt from taxation pursuant to this section shall also
be exempt from special ad valorem levies and special assessments to the
extent provided in section four hundred ninety of this chapter.
Section 420 thus establishes the test for determining the taxable status
of educational property in the state. To qualify for exemption, the prop-
erty must: (1) be owned by a corporation or association organized ex-
clusively for educational purposes, and (2) be used exclusively for carry-
ing out such purposes. In addition, property which yields "pecuniary
profit," as contrasted with "reasonable compensation" for services ren-
dered, to any member or employee of the corporate owner is precluded
from exemption.
What are the basic policy considerations which underlie the exemption
Property (1933); Tobin, Hannan & Tolnan, The Exemption From Taxation of Privately
Owned Real Property Used for Religious, Charitable and Educational Purposes in New York
State (1934).
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of educational property from taxation? "One of the best"5 expressions of
these reasons is found in People ex rel. Clarkson Memorial College v.
Haggett:6
Education is declared to be a function of the State. The State may, and
does, provide many of the educational processes. It also may, and does,
delegate its function in that respect to private corporations under suitable
regulations. In such instances, real property of the delegatee, used for the
purposes of its charter, is, in fact, devoted to a public purpose and thereby
becomes quasi-public in nature. Nontaxation of public buildings and prop-
erties is not an act of grace but is a basic principle of our law; it is the rule
and not the exception. Thus, school and college properties may be said to
receive their rights of tax exemption, not as acts of grace from the sovereign,
nor as personal exceptions to the rule that all real property bear its share of
the cost of government, but both upon the principle of nontaxation of public
places and as a quid pro quo for the assumption of a portion of the function
of the State.7
Another and earlier statement of these policy considerations involves a
somewhat different emphasis:
The policy of the law has been, in this State from an early day, to en-
courage, foster and protect corporate institutions of religious and literary
character, because the religious, moral and intellectual culture afforded by
them were deemed, as they are in fact, beneficial to the public, necessary to
the advancement of civilization, and the promotion of the welfare of society.
And, therefore, those institutions have been relieved from the burden of
taxation by statutory exemption.8
In short, New York's policy regarding the exemption of educational
5 This appraisal is Judge Desmond's, dissenting in Semple School for Girls v. Boyland,
308 N.Y. 382, 396, 126 N.E.2d 294, 301 (1955).
0 191 Misc. 621, 77 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1948), aff'd, 274 App.
Div. 732, 87 N.Y.S.2d 491 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 595, 89 N.E.2d 882 (1949).
7 Id. at 624, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 185. The Appellate Division, however, commented upon the
Special Term's statement, as follows:
We do not agree that our statutory prescription whereby the real estate of an educa-
tional corporation is made exempt from taxation is the recognition of any fundamental
right, or the result of an implied compact whereby the State bargained away its
sovereign power to tax in consideration that the one thus freed of the burden would
discharge a part of the State's function and policy in the matter of education. Our
statutory history as to the tax exemption of educational institutions is substantially
the same as regards the exemptions granted to religious and charitable organizations.
.. While that history gives some basis for relaxing the general rule of strict construc-
tion, still, in essence, all such exemptions are in arrest of the sovereign power of the
State. There is no more ground for holding that an educational corporation receives
its tax exemption upon the principle of nontaxation of public places, and as a "quid
pro quo" etc., than a like holding as to exemptions made to religious and charitable,
etc., corporations. . . . As regards all such exemption statutes, it is a matter of ad-
ministrative policy, not a basic principle of our law. There is no constitutional sanction
save the one added in 1938, which merely confirmed certain existing laws. (N.Y. Const.,
Art. XVI, § 1.)
People ex rel. Clarkson Memorial College v. Haggett, 274 App. Div. 732, 735-36, 87 N.Y.S.2d
491, 493-94 (3d Dep't 1949). See also Board of Education v. Pace College, 27 App. Div. 2d
87, 91, 276 N.Y.S.2d 162, 166 (2d Dep't 1966).
8 People ex rei. Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v. Barber, 42 Hun. 27, 30 (N.Y. App.
Div., 5th Dep't 1886), aff'd, 106 N.Y. 669, 13 N.E. 936 (1887).
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property from taxation, whether motivated by humanitarian reasons,
economic considerations, or a combination of both, is historic and well
settled.'
II
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
There are numerous New York decisions involving the principles of
statutory construction which govern the application of section 420 and its
predecessor statutes to the facts of a given case.' ° Thus, it is a thoroughly
established rule that a statute which exempts property from taxation is
strictly construed against the property owner who is claiming the exemp-
tion. Immunity from taxation will be denied unless the statute requires in
clear and unambiguous terms that an exemption be granted. The rationale
for this rule is that the exemption of some property from taxation, regard-
less of its justification, increases proportionately the cost of government
which other property-owners must pay, with inequality of taxation as a
result."
However, when an exemption of educational or church property has
been under consideration, there has been a disposition to temper the rule
of strict construction. The courts have applied this rule "in the light of
the purposes to be furthered by the exemptions, so as not to thwart those
purposes"' " and have recognized that the statute "should not receive an
interpretation so narrow and literal as to defeat or nullify the intention of
the Legislature to encourage, foster and protect corporate institutions of a
religious, literary or educational character."'"
9 See generally Killough, "Exemptions to Educational, Philanthropic and Religious Organi-
zations," in Tax Exemptions 23-38 (Tax Policy League, Inc. 1939); Saxe, supra note 4;
Tobin, Hannan & Tolman, supra note 4.
1o See generally N.Y. Statutes § 294 (1 McKinney 1942, Supp. 1966) ("Exemptions from
taxation") and the cases cited therein.
11 An exemption from taxation is in the nature of a renunciation of sovereignty. It
relieves one class of persons or property from its obligation to bear its share of the
expenses of government, no matter how deserving of assistance that class may be, and
throws a correspondingly heavier burden upon all other classes, thus creating an in-
equality of taxation. It is for this reason that the courts have uniformly refused to
favor exemptions, and have invariably construed statutes freeing property from the
burden of enforced contribution to the expense of maintaining the government most
rigidly against the claimant, and have declined to countenance such immunity unless
the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and unless the purpose of the
Legislature to exempt such property indisputably appears.
Board of Education v. Baker, 241 App. Div. 574, 575-76, 272 N.Y. Supp. 801, 803-04 (4th
Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 636, 195 N.E. 359 (1935).
12 St. Barbara's Roman Catholic Church v. City of New York, 243 App. Div. 371, 373,
277 N.Y. Supp. 538, 541 (2d Dep't 1935).
13 Matter of Syracuse University, 214 App. Div. 375, 377, 212 N.Y. Supp. 253, 256 (4th
Dep't 1925). See also People ex rel. Watchtower Bible Soc'y, Inc. v. Haring, 8 N.Y.2d 350,
170 N.E.2d 677, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1960) ; People ex rel. Doctors Hosp., Inc. v. Sexton, 267
App. Div. 736, 48 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 553, 64 N.E. 273 (1945);
Congregation Emanu-el v. City of New York, 150 Misc. 657, 270 N.Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1934), aff'd, 243 App. Div. 692, 277 N.Y. Supp. 955 (1st Dep't 1935).
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Whether the word "educational" as used in section 420 is given a strict
interpretation and limited to "education fundamentally instructional in
nature,"'14 or is construed more broadly so as to include "a diffusion of
general knowledge or of topics of general interest,"' 5 may determine the
outcome of a particular case. An argument in support of a strict construc-
tion of the word "educational" has been made by Counsel of the State
Board of Equalization and Assessment, as follows:
The statute recites other purposes, namely, "the moral or mental improve-
ment of men and women", "scientific", "literary", "library", "bar associa-
tion" and "historical" purposes, all of which in a broad sense may be classi-
fied as educational. Therefore, if the word "educational" had been used in a
broad general sense, it would have embraced all of the above mentioned
enumerated purposes and it would have been unnecessary to have expressly
set forth such purposes distinctly. 16
III
THE "ORGANIZED ExcLusIvELY" REQUIREMENT
In order to be exempt from taxation, real property must be owned by
a corporation or association "organized exclusively" for educational
purposes. In determining whether this requirement has been met, the
courts generally have based their decisions upon an examination of the
stated purposes of the organization as disclosed by the statute under
which it is incorporated and by its charter, certificate of incorporation,
articles of incorporation, constitution and by-laws, as the case may be.'
14 State Board of Equalization and Assessment, Counsel's letter dated Dec. 4, 1961 regard-
ing taxable status of property to be owned by Mohawk-Hudson Council on Educational
Television, Inc.
15 Ibid.16 Ibid. In Matter of Estate of De Peyster, 210 N.Y. 216, 221, 104 N.E. 714, 715-16 (1914),
a transfer tax case, the court stated:
A corporation or association organized exclusively for scientific, literary, library,
patriotic or historical purposes, or for any one of such purposes, is necessarily to some
extent educational in its nature, and in the results attained from such organization. An
exclusively historical society-does not gather books, manuscripts, pictures and antiquities
simply to hoard them. Its purpose is not alone to discover and preserve things and facts
of historical value, but to keep and record them that they may be seen, read and
studied, that greater knowledge may be attained from them. The legislature in includ-
ing educational corporations or associations in the first part of the statute quoted, in-
tended corporations or associations engaged in something more than the incidental
education which - is necessarily derived from corporations organized exclusively for
scientific, literary, library, patriotic or historical purposes.
If the legislature had not intended to distinguish between an educational corporation
or association as such, and a corporation or association in which education is simply
incidental to, or results from the work of a corporation or association organized forhistorical and other named purposes, there would have been no reason for deliberately
and intentionally placing them in separate groups in the same section of the statute
and generally exempting the first group from all tax on transfers, and only exempting
the last group from transfers of personal property other than money or securities.17 The test as to what is and what is not an exempt charitable corporation may be
gathered from the statute under which it is incorporated (Matter of De Peyster, 210
N.Y. 216 [104 N.E. 714 (1914)J); or, when the act of incorporation is silent, from
its constitution and by-laws (Assn. for Colored Orphans v. Mayor, 104 N.Y. 581 [12
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Thus, Counsel of the State Board of Equalization and Assessment has
stated:
In order to be organized exclusively for exempt purposes, all of the
purposes for which the corporation was organized must be exempt within
section 420, for, if the certificate of incorporation contains purposes which
are not enumerated in section 420, the corporation is not organized ex-
clusively for exempt purposes .... 18
The case of National Council of Jewish Women, Inc. v. Board of
Assessors9 brings into focus the interplay between the requirement that
exempt property be owned by a corporation or association "organized
exclusively" for educational purposes and the further requirement that the
property be "used exclusively"2° for such purposes. The court found that
the property in question was in fact being "used exclusively" for purposes
enumerated in the statute.2' It went on to say regarding the "organized
exclusively" requirement:
However, it is settled beyond dispute that the right of a corporation to
exemption must be determined not from its activities but solely from its
articles of incorporation. If any of its powers are not among those enumer-
ated in subdivision 6 of section 4 of the Tax Law, it is not entitled to tax
exemption .... 22
Then, noting that among the purposes recited in the petitioner's certificate
of incorporation was that of undertaking "to bring about a closer fellow-
ship among Jewish women, ' 23 the court continued:
What are the purposes of these closer relations and closer fellowship?
This broad, general language could encompass social and fraternal activities
N.E. 279 (1887)J) and a similar rule applies to charitable corporations created pursuant
to a will (Webster Apartments v. City of New York, 118 Misc. 91, [193 N.Y. Supp.
6502, aff'd, 206 App. Div. 749 [200 N.Y. Supp. 956 (1922)1).
People ex rel. Untermyer v. McGregor, 295 N.Y. 237, 244, 66 N.E.2d 292, 295. See Matter
of Corporation of Yaddo, 216 App. Div. 1, 214 N.Y. Supp. 523 (3d Dep't 1926); People
ex rel. Provident Loan Soc'y v. Chambers, 196 Misc. 367, 88 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1949), rev'd, 276 App. Div. 755, 92 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd, 301
N.Y. 575, 93 N.E.2d 455 (1950). But see Faculty-Student Ass'n of New York State
College for Teachers v. City of Albany, 17 Misc. 2d 404, 191 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1959); Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Owens, 19 Misc. 2d 244,
195 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. Onandaga County 1959); Plattsburgh State Teachers College
Benevolent & Educational Ass'n v. Barnard, 9 Misc. 2d 897, 170 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct.
Clinton County 1958).
18 State Board of Equalization and Assessment, Counsel's letter dated Dec. 4, 1961 regard-
ing taxable status of property to be owned by Mohawk-Hudson Council on Educational
Television, Inc.
19 21 Misc. 2d 142, 189 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959).
20 This latter requirement is discussed in detail in text accompanying notes 45-80, infra.
21 National Council of Jewish Women, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 21 Misc. 2d 142, 143,
189 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959). "The court finds, in short, that the
property is being devoted solely to the mental improvement of men and women and for
charitable, benev olent and educational purposes, and not for material gain." Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Id. at 144, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
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and objectives. No interpretation, no matter how strained, could limit them
exclusively to religious, charitable, patriotic or educational aims....
Regardless of the true nature of the activities carried on by the petitioner,
the broad scope of its articles of incorporation does not limit it to those
activities which are enumerated in the statute....
The court, therefore, most reluctantly concludes that the express language
of petitioner's charter bars it from the benefits conferred . . . [by the
statute] 24
This decision thus emphasizes the crucial importance of the declared
use of an organization's real property as set forth in its certificate of in-
corporation and by-laws. In this context, two further cases merit special
attention: National Navy Club, Inc. v. City of New York 25 and People
ex rel. Untermyer v. McGregor.2 6
In the first of these cases, the Navy Club provided rooms, meals and
entertainment for Naval enlisted personnel on leave in New York City,
with the stated purpose of thereby strengthening their morale. The City
contended, however, that the organization was not entitled to tax exemp-
tion because, in addition to the clearly benevolent and patriotic objects
recited in the organization's charter, there was also included another
purpose which was not among those enumerated in the statute, namely, Cto
establish and maintain . . . for their use and accommodation suitable
quarters, including reading and writing rooms, baths, canteens, lodgings
and such other facilities and such appurtenances and belongings as are
usual in clubs or clubhouses .... "27
Rejecting the City's contention that the inclusion of this last declared
purpose defeated the corporation's claim for tax exemption, the court said:
The fair construction of these clauses is indicated by the manner in
which plaintiff has proceeded to carry out the objects they express....
The main and controlling objects for plaintiff's existence and organization
are none the less exclusive, in the statutory sense, because they can only be
accomplished by subsidiary activities, such as providing quarters for men
during their usually brief periods on shore....
It is true that plaintiff's charter refers to other objects but clearly they are
24 Id. at 144-45, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 626. See also Good Will Club, Inc. v. City of Amsterdam,
31 Misc. 2d 1096, 222 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. Montgomery County 1961) ; American-Russian
Aid Ass'n v. City of Glen Cove, 41 Misc. 2d 622, 246 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1964); Note, "Federal Income and New York Real Property Charitable Tax Exemptions:
Application of the 'Exclusive' Test," 35 St. John's L. Rev. 96, 98-99 (1960).
26 122 Misc. 89, 203 N.Y. Supp. 114 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1923).
26 295 N.Y. 237, 66 N.E.2d 292 (1946).
27 National Navy Club, Inc. v. City of New York, 122 Misc. 89, 93, 203 N.Y. Supp 114,
117 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1923).
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merely the means or methods of carrying out the ultimate purpose of its
existence.25 .
The second case, People ex rel. Untermyer v. McGregor,9 involved the
taxable status of real property owned by a corporation which had been
organized, according to its certificate of incorporation, "to develop, im-
prove, maintain and operate such land as and for a public park and
gardens, and, if and to the extent so determined by its directors from time
to time, as and for a public playground and/or for horticultural purposes
.... )230 Although the statute covers a public playground purpose in specific
terms, it makes no mention of a horticultural purpose. The Court of
Appeals, nevertheless, decided that the property in question was exempt
from taxation. In the words of Judge Dye:
The lower courts have construed these words to mean that the trustees
of the corporation may devote the property to charitable public use or, in
the alternative, horticultural purposes independent of public use and solely
for the exclusive and private use and enjoyment of the members of the
corporation....
N... owhere is it said that the horticultural purpose is to be co-ordinate
or equal. It is rather an embellishment or adjunct to the successful main-
tenance and development of the whole project as a place of healthy and
cultural enjoyment.... [A]nd when we take into consideration the exclu-
sive public use to which the executors and trustees, during their interim
ownership, and the trustees of the corporation have devoted the property,
it seems clear and indisputable that it is exempt from taxation....az
Counsel of the State Board of Equalization and Assessment has ap-
praised the significance of the National Navy Club and Untermyer cases
in the following terms:
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that although the statute
requires that the corporation be organized exclusively for one or more of the
statutory purposes and although it is well settled that a tax exemption
statute must be construed strictly against the taxpayer, the courts will grant
exemption where it appears that the purposes stated in the certificate of
incorporation but which are not covered by the statute are merely incidental
and subsidiary to its main purposes which are within the statute; that such
incidental purposes are more or less necessary to fulfill its main purposes
and that the actual use of the property fulfills purposes for which it was
formed and which are within the statute.3 2
28 Id. at 93-94, 203 N.Y. Supp. at 117-18.
29 295 N.Y. 237, 66 N.E.2d 292 (1946).
30 Id. at 242, 66 N.E.2d at 294.
31 Id. at 243-44, 66 N.E.2d at 294-95.
32 State Board of Equalization and Assessment, Counsel's letter dated Aug. 17, 1950
regarding taxable status of property occupied by Keuka Park Community Center, Inc. In a
letter dated Aug. 4, 1949 concerning the taxable status of property owned by Fredonia State
Teachers Alumni Association, Counsel of the Board stated:
It has also been held, however, that a corporation may be "organized exclusively"
for one or more of the statutory purposes, although its certificate of incorporation in-
cludes other purposes, providing such other purposes are "means and methods" of accom-
plishing its main purposes which are within the statute. (National Navy Club, Inc. v.
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As has been noted, the exemption from taxation provided for by section
420 is limited to real property owned by a corporation or association organ-
ized exclusively for one or more of the purposes enumerated therein. The
fact that the statute refers specifically to ownership by a corporation or
association indicates that incorporation is not prerequisite to exemption
and that section 420 is applicable to property owned by an unincorporated
association. There is little authority on this point,8" a result presumably
due to the fact that in New York, apart from statutory authorization, an
unincorporated non-profit association cannot take title to real property.,
The recent case of Board of Cooperative Educational Services v.
Buckley"3 is one of the few cases bearing on this general question. Under
relevant provisions of the Education law,3 6 a board of cooperative educa-
tional services is created as "a body corporate," is authorized to hold
City of New York, 122 Misc. 89 [203 N.Y. Supp. 114 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1923)]; see also People ex rel. Untermyer v. McGregor, 295 N.Y. 237 [66 N.E.2d 292
(1946)].
33 The words "religious society" when used in the laws of this state, as they frequently
are, generally have reference to an incorporated religious society. It cannot be supposed
that it was the legislative intention that any number of persons could come together
for some religious purpose and set up a school and then claim the exemption. In using
the words "religious society" it is most probable that the law-makers had in mind some
legal entity capable as such of taking and holding property, and popularly known as a
religious society.
Church of St. Monica v. Mayor of City of New York, 119 N.Y. 91, 95-96, 23 N.E. 294,
295-96 (1890). See also Chegary v. Mayor of New York, 13 N.Y. 220 (1855); Chegary v.
Jenkins, 5 N.Y. 376 (1851); Board of Education v. Baker, 241 App. Div. 574, 272 N.Y.
Supp. 801 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 636, 195 N.E. 359 (1935); Berocho v. Mayor
of City of New York, 18 N.Y. Supp. 792 (Super. Ct. New York City 1892); Annot., 95
A.L.R. 62, 79-80 (1935); Note, "Tax Exemptions of the Property of Educational Institu-
tions," 6 Geo. Wash. Law Rev. 342, 351-52 (1938).
In a letter dated Dec. 12, 1962 concerning the taxable status of real property owned by
the Spiritual Science Foundation, Counsel of the State Board of Equalization and Assessment
stated:
A preliminary examination of the trust agreement creating the Spiritual Science
Foundation discloses that it is organized exclusively for one or more of the exempt
purposes within the meaning of subdivision 1, section 420. An examination of the
material forwarded to us regarding the use of the property indicates that such property
is used exclusively for educational purposes.
However, since the Spiritual Science Foundation is not a corporation or association
within the meaning of subdivision 1, section 420, it is not entitled to exemption on
its property (Church of St. Monica v. Mayor, 119 N.Y. 91 [23 N.E. 294 (1890)] ; People
ex rel. National Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Lewis, 179 Misc. 140, 39 N.Y.S.2d
64; [(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1942)]; Hunter College S.S.C. & R.C. Ass'n v. City of
New York, 63 N.Y.S.2d 337 [(Sup. Ct. New York County 1946)].
It should be noted that under the trust agreement, the trustees have the power to
incorporate. Therefore, based on the facts furnished to us it appears that if the Spiritual
Science Foundation is incorporated for the purposes set forth in the first agreement...
the property would be entitled to an exemption.
31 For a comprehensive treatment of the status of unincorporated associations in New
York and the statutory and decisional law applicable thereto, see N.Y. Leg. Doc. 174th Sess.
No. 65(J) (1951) ("Act, Recommendation and Studies relating to Devises and Bequests to
Unincorporated Associations"); 1951 N.Y. Law Revision Commission Report 325-499. See
also Board of Education v. Baker, supra note 33.
35 42 Misc. 2d 450, 248 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County), aff'd, 21 App. Div.
2d 784, 250 N.Y.S.2d 528 (2d Dep't 1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 971, 207 N.E.2d 528, 259
N.Y.S.2d 858 (1965).
36 N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 1958(4), (6) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
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property "as a corporation," and is given power to "rent" facilities in
which to carry out its functions. The taxable status of the board's real
property was in dispute and in deciding that the property did not qualify
for tax exemption, the Appellate Division stated: "In our opinion, a board
of cooperative educational services organized pursuant to Section 1958 of
the Education Law has no authority to purchase real property.., and
therefore the real property purchased by it is not exempt from taxation
under Section 420 of the Real Property Tax Law .... "7 However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, stating: "The Board
possesses the power to own property (Education Law, § 1958, subd. 6)
which qualifies for an exemption under the Real Property Tax Law
(§420). The mode of acquisition is deemed irrelevant for tax purposes. '38
A related question of whether an exemption may be claimed only by a
domestic corporation organized under NewYork law was before the court
in Williams Institutional Colored Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of
New York." In exempting property owned by a foreign corporation, the
court stated:
The statute by its terms draws no distinction between foreign and
domestic corporations. It is the use of the premises, the carrying out of the
exempt purposes that is the basic test.
Defendant, however, and the Special Term, insert a qualifying and limit-
ing term, not inserted by the Legislature, so that the statute is changed
from reading as it does, "a corporation or association" to "a [domestic]
corporation." We think there is no warrant for thus materially changing
and restricting the clear and unambiguous terms of the law.40
It should be noted that section 420 expressly precludes an exemption
where an officer, member or employee of an owning corporation or asso-
ciation receives or is entitled to receive "pecuniary profit;" such a person,
however, may be paid "reasonable compensation" for services rendered
without jeopardizing an exemption. In the abstract, the formula to deter-
mine whether there is "pecuniary profit" in a given case is clear. For ex-
ample: "Exemption from the general property tax is not conditioned upon
whether an enterprise is profitable. It depends upon whether one would
reasonably expect that if a profit were made it would inure to the benefit,
37 Board of Coop. Educ. Services v. Buckley, 21 App. Div. 2d 784, 250 N.Y.S.2d 528
(2d Dep't 1964).
38 Board of Coop. Educ. Services v. Buckley, 15 N.Y.2d 971, 973, 207 NE.2d 528, 259
N.Y.S.2d 858, 859 (1965). See Murphy & Sitrin, "State and Local Taxation," 17 Syracuse L.
Rev. 204, 209 (1965).
39 275 App. Div. 311, 89 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 716, 92 N.E.2d
58 (1950).
40 Id. at 313, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 302. But see People ex rel. Andrews v. Cameron, 140 App.
Div. 76, 124 N.Y. Supp. 949 (3d Dep't 1910), aff'd, 200 N.Y. 585, 94 N.E. 1097 (1911);
Hunter College Student Social Community & Religious Clubs Ass'n v. City of New York,
63 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1946).
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among other aspects, of any 'officer, member or employee' of the educa-
tional corporation."" Or: "Plainly, the statute, when it referred to 'pecu-
niary profit from the operations' of a school, meant just that, and intended
to refuse exemption to those educational corporations only, where the
insiders received or were lawfully entitled to receive corporate operating
profits.) 42
The application of this formula, however, to the specific facts of a
particular case can prove difficult. Thus, in People ex rel. Rye County Day
School v. Schmidt,4" the stockholders of the educational corporation were
entitled to share in a division of its assets upon dissolution. Reversing the
Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals held that the corporation's real
property was taxable, stating: "The corporate operation of the respondent
may lawfully entitle some of its members to receive pecuniary profit other
than reasonable compensation for services in effecting any of its educa-
tional purposes." '44
IV
THE "USED ExcLusIvELy" REQUIREMENT
The bulk of litigation involving the taxable status of educational prop-
erty under Section 420 of the Real Property Tax Law centers around the
statutory requirement that the property be "used exclusively" for educa-
tional purposes. It should be noted that the Real Property Tax Law pro-
vides a detailed procedure for the judicial review of real property assess-
ments.45 A proceeding brought pursuant to these provisions is the exclusive
remedy available to a taxpayer desiring to challenge an alleged erroneous
or unequal assessment. 6 Other remedies, however, are open to a taxpayer
alleging that the property in question is exempt from taxation by law and
that the action of the assessing officer was therefore without jurisdiction
41 Semple School for Girls v. Boyland 308 N.Y. 382, 387, 126 N.E.2d 294, 295 (1955)
(Van Voorhis, J.).
42 Id. at 394, 126 N.E.2d at 299 (Desmond, J., dissenting).
43 266 N.Y. 196, 194 N.E. 405 (1935).
44 Id. at 198, 194 N.E. at 406. See also Semple School for Girls v. Boyland, supra note
41; People ex rel. Manlius School v. Adams, 143 Misc. 459, 256 N.Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct.
Onandaga County 1930), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 869, 249 N.Y. Supp. 897 (4th Dep't 1931),
aff'd, 257 N.Y. 549, 178 N.E. 790 (1931); Lawrence-Smith School v. City of New York, 166
Misc. 856, 2 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. New York County), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 762, 7
N.Y.S.2d 486 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 805, 21 N.E.2d 693 (1939); People ex rel.
Provident Loan Soc'y v. Chambers, 196 Misc. 367, 88 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1949), rev'd, 276 App. Div. 755, 92 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd, 301 N.Y.
575 (1950).
45 N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 700-726 (McKinney 1960, Supp. 1966).
46 See, e.g., State Insurance Fund v. Boyland, 282 App. Div. 516, 125 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1st
Dep't 1953), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 1009, 133 N.E.2d 457 (1956); Petley v. Hall, 48 Misc. 2d 807,
266 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Sup. Ct. Chenango County 1965); Oak Island Beach Ass'n v. Mascari, 44
Misc. 2d 514, 253 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1964); Cedzich v. City of New
York, 19 Misc. 2d 572, 190 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1959) ; 22 Carmody-Wait,
Cyclopedia of New York Practice 581-587 (1956, Supp. 1966).
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and void." In this latter case, the aggrieved party "may proceed, for
example, by an action for declaratory judgment, or by a proceeding under
Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act [now Civil Practice Law & Rules], to
annul the act of the tax officer, or by an action to remove a cloud on title,
or by an action to recover the moneys paid in satisfaction of the tax so
imposed."4 The payment of taxes in past years without protest will not
estop a taxpayer from subsequently claiming an exemption.49
The term "educational" as used in section 420 is a comprehensive one.
It embraces mental, moral and physical education. Thus, the Appellate
Division has stated that "It may be assumed that the use of real property
for the cultivation of athletics is an educational purpose under the Tax
Law ... . o "Educational" contemplates both instruction and research.5
It covers informal as well as formal instruction. And it includes not only
the more traditional educational institutions ranging from nursery
schools8 2 through colleges and universities, but also organizations devoted
to such activities as educational television programs and community
theatre productions.
The fact that an educational purpose may be served by informal instruc-
tion considerably removed from the traditional teacher-student-classroom
situation is well illustrated by Little Theatre, Inc. v. Hoyt. 3 Here the
47 Petitioner seeks to review a determination of the basic jurisdictional issue as to
whether this property is in fact taxable at all. And repeatedly and uniformly the courts
have held that statutes purporting to set up exclusive procedures for reviewing tax
assessments do not bar collateral action when the taxes are levied without jurisdiction.
State Insurance Fund v. Boyland, supra note 46, at 519-20, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 173. See the
other authorities cited in note 46 supra, and American-Russian Aid Ass'n v. City of Glen
Cove, 41 Misc. 2d 622, 246 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964).
48 22 Carmody-Wait, supra note 46, at 585-86.
49 "The contention by the city that the hospital is estopped through having paid taxes
in earlier years, as a sort of practical construction, is unsound." St. Luke's Hospital v.
Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d 135, 145, 187 N.E.2d 769, 773, 237 N.Y.S.2d 308, 314 (1962).
50 People ex rel. Adelphi College v. Wells, 97 App. Div. 312, 314, 89 N.Y. Supp. 957,
958 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd, 180 N.Y. 534, 72 N.E. 1147 (1905). See State Board of Equaliza-
tion and Assessment, Counsel's letter dated Aug. 21, 1950 regarding taxable-status of property
owned by Paul Smith's College and used by students for skiing. See also Buffalo Turn Verein
v. Reuling, 155 Misc. 797, 281 N.Y. Supp. 545 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1935), aff'd, 257 App.
Div. 902, 12 N.Y.S.2d 170 (4th Dep't 1939); Plattsburgh College Benevolent & Educ. Ass'n
v. Board of Assessors, 43 Misc. 2d 741, 252 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. Clinton County 1964).
51 See People ex rel. Johnson O'Connor Research Foundation, Inc. v. Tax Comm'rs, 96
N.Y.S.2d 36, 37-38 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1950):
[R]esearch in the field of psychometrics, which involves the measurement of aptitudes,
... constitutes an educational or a scientific purpose within the meaning of the statute.
The fact that the results of relator's efforts at research may not be generally ac-
cepted as correct in the educational or scientific world is not fatal to its claim that it
is engaged in educational and scientific pursuit. The types and character of its activities,
not their quality, is determinative.
52 See People ex rel. Trustees v. Mezger, 98 App. Div. 237, 90 N.Y. Supp. 488 (2d
Dep't 1904), aff'd, 181 N.Y. 511, 73 N.E. 1130 (1905) (military academy); Croton Com-
munity Nursery School v. Coulter, 121 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1953),
rev'd, 283 App. Div. 716, 127 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2d Dep't 1954) (nursery school).
53 7 Misc. 2d 907, 165 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1956), aff'd, 4 App.
Div. 2d 853, 167 N.Y.S.2d 240 (4th Dep't 1957).
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petitioner's premises, devoted to the various activities connected with
staging plays, were held to be used for educational purposes, the court
pointing out that the performance of a play following weeks of rehearsal
"serves as a vehicle for concentrated training and education in the art of
dramatics and stage management to those participating therein."5 4
With respect to educational television, Counsel of the State Board of
Equalization and Assessment has stated:
We have been advised that the afternoon and evening programs will consist
of informal presentations in the form of lectures and discussions and pro-
grams of music appreciation.... Since such programs as a whole appear to
consist mainly of instructional in-school courses, with a primary end of
providing formal education not only to grade school pupils, but also on
post-graduate levels,.. . the presentation of such programs would constitute
an educational purpose within the spirit and the letter of section 420 of the
Real Property Tax Law.
The fact that the late afternoon and evening schedule will consist of less
formal presentations, including current events, will not vary this conclusion,
since such presentations will constitute a coordinate part of the function of
the Mohawk Council as an educational body of this type.55
In deciding whether property devoted to a particular activity falls
within the statutory requirement of exclusive educational use, the New
York courts have over the years consistently adhered to a general formula
which is as simple to state in the abstract as it is oftentimes difficult to
apply in concrete cases. In 1901 the Appellate Division said: "In deter-
mining whether property is used for the purposes of an institution of this
kind so as to exempt it from taxation, it must-be made to appear that the
use is necessary or fairly incidental to the maintenance of the institution
for the carrying out of the purposes for which it was organized." 50 Almost
sixty years later the Court of Appeals reaffirmed this basic formula:
"Historically and in reason, the only test is whether the ... operation is
reasonably incident to the major purpose of its owner."5 7
Thus tested, premises used by college fraternities have been denied
exemption. There may be a question in a given case as to whether par-
54 Id. at 911, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
55 State Board of Equalization and Assessment, Counsel's letter dated Dec. 4, 1961 re-
garding taxable status of property to be owned by Mohawk-Hudson Council on Educational
Television, Inc.
56 People ex rel. Blackburn v. Barton, 63 App. Div. 581, 583, 71 N.Y. Supp. 933, 935
(4th Dep't 1901).
57 People ex rel. Watchtower Bible Soc'y v. Haring, 8 N.Y.2d 350, 358, 170 N.E.2d 677,
681, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673, 678 (1960).
58 See, e.g., People ex rel. Delta Kappa Epsilon Soc'y v. Lawler, 74 App. Div. 553, 77
N.Y. Supp. 840 (4th Dep't 1902), aff'd, 179 N.Y. 535, 71 N.E. 1136 (1904); People ex
rel. Cornell Univ. v. Thorne, 184 Misc. 630, 57 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County
1945). But see also People ex rel. Walcott v. Parker, 84 Misc. 534, 146 N.Y. Supp. 753
(Sup. Ct. Broome County 1914) (property of Telluride Association at Cornell University
held exempt).
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ticular housing facilities are occupied by a fraternity of the traditional
type or whether they accommodate a group living unit which meets the
requirement of exclusive educational use. The determination of this ques-
tion will, of course, depend on the specific facts before the court.59 In any
event, property has been held entitled to exemption when used for such
purposes as dining halls and cafeterias; hospital and infirmary facilities;
and living quarters for students, faculty and administrative personnel.60
In this connection, it should be noted that tax exemption is not lost
merely because an institution undertakes to achieve an exempt purpose
through an independent contractor rather than by using its own employees.
Thus, when Pace College entered into an agreement with Horn & Hardart
to operate the college cafeteria, the court decided that this did not impair
the exempt status of the property:
This cafeteria is part of the operation of Pace College....
SThe particular method adopted by a college for performing this function
is not controlling .... It is said that exemption can adhere only if the
college operates the cafeteria itself, but the college has to do so through
others. It matters not whether this is done by servants who are directly
employed by the college, or by an independent contractor .... The college
retains general supervision and control over the operation, which is directed
exclusively to the accomplishment of its educational purposes. 61
Vacant, unimproved land presents a special problem in so far as the
exclusive use requirement is concerned. Section 420(3) provides in this
connection that non-income-producing property which is not in "actual
use" for educational purposes because of the absence of suitable facilities
thereon shall nevertheless qualify for exemption if the construction of such
facilities "is in progress or is in good faith contemplated"'62 or if title to the
property is subject to reversion in the event that facilities not appropriate
for educational purposes are erected on the premises.63
A parcel of vacant land has been exempted from taxation, notwithstand-
ing its unimproved state, when it has been regarded as an integral part of
59 See, e.g., Cornell University v. Board of Assessors, 24 App. Div. 2d 526, 260 N.Y.S.2d
197 (3d Dep't 1965).
60 See, e.g., St. Luke's Hosp. v. Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d 135, 187 N.E.2d 769, 237 N.Y.S.2d
308 (1962); Matter of Syracuse University, 214 App. Div. 375, 212 N.Y. Supp. 253 (4th
Dep't 1925); People ex rel. Clarkson Memorial College v. Haggett, 191 Misc. 621, 77 N.Y.S.2d
182 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1948), aff'd, 274 App. Div. 732, 87 N.Y.S.2d 491 (3d
Dep't), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 595, 89 N.E.2d 882 (1949).
61 Pace College v. Boyland, 4 N.Y.2d 528, 532-34, 151 N.E.2d 900, 902-03, 176 N.Y.S.2d
356, 358-60 (1958).
62 See Roman Catholic Diocese v. City of New York, 38 Misc. 2d 815, 238 N.Y.S.2d
889 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1963).
63 See Matter of Ladycliff College, 266 App. Div. 753, 41 N.Y.S.2d 149 (2d Dep't 1943),
aff'd, 293 N.Y. 712, 56 N.E.2d 729 (1944) (the part of the statute distinguishing between
ownership of property in conditional rather than absolute fee will be given a literal
construction).
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an educational enterprise.6 4 In this situation, some courts have indicated
an interest in whether the idle parcel in question is a separate and detached
plot or whether it is contiguous to other property which is clearly used
for educational purposes and thus entitled to exemption. 65
An educational institution may acquire vacant land and continue to
hold it in its unimproved state in order to guard against undesirable
activities thereon or to protect a view with respect to other property then
being used for exempt purposes. The case of In re Major Deegan Boule-
yard,6 6 involving New York University's Hall of Fame for Great Ameri-
cans, is relevant in this connection. Here the court stated:
The land which is subject to the taxes, relief with respect of which is now
sought, was acquired to protect the far flung view from the Hall of Fame
and as well as to keep said structure visible from the Harlem River and the
heights of Manhattan arising from the west shore of said river....
In the existing street development around the university its needs for
additional space have not been capable of satisfaction by acquisition of
parcels contiguous to the large plot. Nor, for the same reason, is the view
from the Hall of Fame capable of protection by acquisition of contiguous
plots. Yet protection of the view from the Hall of Fame and of visibility
thereto are, it is held, a proper university function.67
Another aspect of this general problem involved an inquiry to the State
Board of Equalization and Assessment as to whether a tax exemption
might be granted on a "vacant lot purchased by Wells College to 'protect'
college-owned faculty houses, presumably tax exempt, adjoining either
side of the lot.""8 Counsel of the Board replied:
64 See Matter of Mary Immaculate School, 188 App. Div. 5, 175 N.Y. Supp. 701 (2d
Dep't 1919); People ex rel. Sailors' .Snug Harbor v. Miller, 169 Misc. 19, 6 N.Y.S.2d 787
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1938). But see People ex rel. Blackburn v. Barton, 63 App. Div.
581, 71 N.Y. Supp. 933 (4th Dep't 1901).
65 See People ex rel. Missionary Sisters v. Reilly, 85 App. Div. 71, 83 N.Y. Supp. 39
(2d Dep't 1903), aff'd 178 N.Y. 609, 70 N.E. 1107 (1904); In re Major Deegan Blvd.,
131 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Conty 1954); New York Catholic Protectory v. City of
New York, 174 Misc. 427, 23 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1940). See also St. Luke's
Hosp. v. Boyland, supra note 60, at 144, 187 N.E.2d at 773, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 313: "That
is not a crucial factor. Neither is the circumstance that these buildings are across the street
from St. Luke's Hospital and not immediately contiguous thereto."
66 Supra note 65.
67 Id. at 331-32. See also People ex rel. Untermyer v. McGregor, 295 N.Y. 237, 66
N.E.2d 292 (1946):
From the record it appears that the property affords a view of the Hudson River
beyond Tappan Zee north and south to the George Washington Bridge which might
and could be destroyed if the property were sold and buildings erected. We feel that
it should be treated as an integral part of the park and while so used, exempt from
taxation.
Id. at 244, 66 N.E.2d at 295; In re Miriam Osborn Memorial Home Ass'n, 140 N.Y. Supp.
786, 787 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1912): "[Tlhe acquiring of these two tracts is
evidently very important to the association, because of the protection given the property
against undesirable building or business which might otherwise exist on the two tracts in
question.'
68 State Board of Equalization and Assessment, Counsel's letter dated March 13, 1950
regarding taxable status of Wells College property.
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In the light of the foregoing cases, it appears that the test of exclusive use
provided by the statute is met if the possession of the vacant lot by Wells
College "protects" other adjoining exempt property owned by it in that it
affords a frontage or outlet for such other property, or in that it prevents the
intrusion of undesirable buildings or business, or in that it affords to the rest
of the property a view which might otherwise be destroyed. Likewise, it
would appear that such lot would be exclusively used for educational pur-
poses if it aided in the development of the educational purposes of the
corporation in some other way so that it could fairly be treated as an integral
part of the college system. It further appears that the circumstance that
the lot does not adjoin the college campus or that it is not absolutely
necessary for a successful conduct of the college is not sufficient reason to
deny tax exemption. 69
As indicated, the exclusive use of property for educational purposes is
prerequisite for exemption from taxation under section 420. In this
context, does the fact that income is derived from the property preclude
such an exemption? This question requires examination from a number
of different points of view.
In the first place, it should be noted that section 420(2) expressly
provides for pro tanto exemption: whenever part of specified premises are
leased or otherwise used for non-exempt purposes, such part will be
subject to taxation, and only the balance of the property which is being
used exclusively for educational purposes will be entitled to exemption.
However, one exempt corporation may permit its real property to be
used by another exempt corporation for exempt purposes without losing
its right of exemption "so long as any moneys paid for such use do not
exceed the amount of the carrying, maintenance and depreciation charges
of the property or portion thereof, as the case may be."'70
Property which is used primarily for income or investment purposes
unrelated to the basic educational function of an institution is not entitled
to tax exemption."1 In such circumstances, moreover, an exemption will
not be saved merely because the income in turn is used for a concededly
exempt purpose. People ex rel. Young Men's Ass'n v. Sayles72 is a case in
point. One part of the premises involved in this litigation was used for
library purposes and thus clearly exempt from taxation; another part,
consisting of theatre facilities, was rented to others for public enter-
69 Ibid.
70 N.Y. Real Prop. Tax. Law § 420(2) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
71 See People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge v. Burke, 228 N.Y. 245, 126 N.E. 703 (1920); Pratt
Institute v. City of New York, 99 App. Div. 525, 91 N.Y. Supp. 136 (2d Dep't 1904),
aff'd, 183 N.Y. 151, 75 N.E. 1119 (1905); People ex rel. Adeiphi College v. Wells, 97 App.
Div. 312, 89 N.Y. Supp. 957 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd, 180 N.Y. 534, 72 N.E. 1147 (1905);
People ex rel. Young Men's Ass'n v. Sayles, 32 App. Div. 197, 53 N.Y. Supp. 67 (3d
Dep't), aff'd, 157 N.Y. 677, 51 N.E. 1093 (1898); People ex rel. The Frick Collection v.
Chambers, 196 Misc. 1026, 91 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1949), aff'd, 276
App. Div. 891, 94 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1st Dep't 1950).
72 Supra note 71.
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tainment. The owner devoted this rental income exclusively to the main-
tenance of the library. The court was "asked to hold that, because the
rentals of the commercial portions of this building are applied to the
expenses of the benevolent objects promoted in the other portion, there-
fore, in effect, the whole building is exclusively used for benevolent
purposes, and for none other."" Responding to this request, the court
stated:
In our view the statute does not permit us this pleasure....
It is the exclusive use of the real estate for carrying out thereupon one or
more of the purposes of the incorporation of the relator which confers the
right of exemption, and not the benefits accruing to it and its useful work
from the income derived from others in consideration of their use of the
real estate for their purposes. 74
Although as indicated above, the production of income may jeopardize
the tax-exempt status which property might otherwise enjoy, this is by
no means a necessary consequence. If the income results from activities
which are reasonably c6nnected with and fairly incidental to the basic
educational purpose of the institution and is not excessive in amount,
then its receipt will not adversely affect the owner's right of exemption.
Thus, payment of tuition by students for their education and payment
of rent by faculty members for university-owned housing accommodations
will not impair tax exemptions.7
5
Two Jehovah's Witnesses cases are helpful in this connection. Involved
in each of them was the sale to outsiders of surplus foodstuffs grown on
the organization's farm in upstate New York and the impact of these sales
upon the farm's tax-exempt status. In People ex rel. Watchtower Bible
Soc'y v. Mastin,76 where the surpluses constituted approximately thirty-
five per cent of the total production and were marketed under a rather
systematic sales program, the Special Term denied an exemption, saying:
The line of cases cited involving educational institutions, where farms
were operated for experimental, scientific and demonstration purposes and
some products were sold, need not be distinguished individually. The prop-
erty in question here was used for no such purpose. It is unnecessary to
distinguish individually the line of cases holding that occasional sporadic,
irregular and insignificant sales do not destroy the exemption. The factual
situation here is not comparable. 77
73 Id. at 200, 53 N.Y. Supp. at 69.
7 Id. at 200, 202, 53 N.Y. Supp. at 69, 71. See also the other authorities cited in note
71 supra.
75 See St. Luke's Hosp. v. Boy]and, 12 N.Y.2d 135, 187 N.E.2d 769, 237 N.Y.S.2d 308
(1962); Semple School for Girls v. Boyland, 308 N.Y. 382, 126 N.Y.2d 294 (1955); Matter
of Mary Immaculate School, 188 App. Div. 5, 175 N.Y. Supp. 701 (2d Dep't 1919).
76 191 Misc. 899, 80 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1948).
77 Id. at 905, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
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In People ex rel. Watchtower Bible Soc'y v. Haring,78 however, where
five to ten per cent of the produce was sold to the public as surplus, the
Court of Appeals exempted the farm lands from taxation, stating: "We
do not see how disposal of surpluses of this comparatively small size
could in reason be held to be more than incidental and insubstantial."79
Counsel of the State Board of Equalization and Assessment recently
had occasion to discuss this question of the taxable status of revenue-
producing property and said, in part:
Property used exclusively for exempt purposes has been held to include
facilities which are reasonably necessary to fulfill required functions of a
completed educational or religious institution. Thus, parking facilities for
student's vehicles which are maintained exclusively for student's use and
convenience would appear to be reasonably necessary in carrying out the
Institution's purposes. The fact that a charge may be imposed upon the use
of a parking lot will not of itself preclude exemption. If a charge is made in
order to realize a profit from the operation, such parking lot would not be
exempt. However, a charge imposed upon the use of a parking lot in order
to defray costs of maintenance, or as a control factor in its use . . . will not
destroy the exempt status of a parking lot. The incidental use of such
parking lots to accommodate the overflow of cars owned by persons attend-
ing the educational, religious or cultural programs of the Institution would
not preclude an exemption of such parcels.80
CONCLUSION
The present state constitutional safeguards surrounding the exemption
of educational property from taxation are an outgrowth of the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1938.1 New York is now on the eve of the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1967, and there is every reason to believe that
problems relating to taxation and finance will again command the atten-
tion of the delegates. It is hoped that the foregoing discussion of the
taxable status of property of educational institutions may prove relevant
and useful in this as well as in other contexts.
78 8 N.Y.2d 350, 170 N.E.2d 677, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1960).
79 Id. at 354, 170 N.E.2d at 678, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 675. See Note, "Federal Income
and New York Real Property Charitable Tax Exemptions: Application of the 'Exclusive'
Test," 35 St. John's L. Rev. 96, 99-103 (1960). See also Syracuse University v. Murphy, 100
App. Div. 2d 468, 200 N.Y.S.2d 807 (3d Dep't 1960); New York Conference Ass'n of
Seventh-Day Adventists v. Schenck, 111 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga County 1949),
rev'd, 279 App. Div. 845, 109 N.Y.S.2d 774 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 706, 107
N.E.2d 654 (1952).
80 State Board of Equalization and Assessment, Counsel's letter dated Sept. 2, 1966
regarding taxable status of property owned by Chautauqua Institution. See also N.Y. Ops.
State Tax Comm'r, in 31 State Dep't 91 (1924) (regarding taxable status of property of
Eastman School of Music). For a discussion of the related question of the taxable status of
property which yields "pecuniary profit," as contrasted with "reasonable compensation"
for services rendered, to any member or employee of the corporate owner, see text ac-
companying notes 41-44 supra.
81 See N.Y. Const. art. 16, § 1. See also Report of 1938 New York State Constitutional
Convention Committee, Vol. X, ch. X, "Tax Exemptions Under the General Property Tax.'
